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While the period between World War I and World War II was marked by
an upsurge of concern about the dumping of merchandise from the Soviet
Union, especially timber and timber products,' no evidence has been found
of how such practices would have been treated under the 1921 U.S. anti-
dumping law. During the 1950s and 1960s, trade began to increase between
the West and Comecon countries upon which Stalinist Soviet-style eco-
nomic models had been imposed following World War II (Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria).
These changing trade patterns at times adversely affected U.S. industries,
giving rise to concerns as to whether these new sources of competition were
trading fairly. Thus, the U.S. was forced to develop a method of handling
allegations of dumping by such countries as the traditional methods were
considered unsuitable for the task of measuring price discrimination when
these prices were set by a centralized public authority.
This article chronicles the search for an appropriate method of measuring
fair value, and assesses the legal and economic justifications for such a
*O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C. Formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of Com-
merce for Import Administration.
tCoopers & Lybrand, Washington, D.C. Formerly Economist, Import Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce.
1. In 1930 and 1931, Soviet products were found to be dumped and restrictions were imposed
in France, Belgium, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Canada. At this time, the United
States imposed a prohibitively high tariff on Soviet match imports and mandated that all
imports of Soviet timber be accompanied by certificates which stated that the products had not
been processed by forced labor. The Soviets responded quickly to the imposition of these trade
restrictions, cutting off all trade with France, Canada and several other countries. This action
drew its desired response-France retracted her restrictions in July, 1931 and Canada lifted
hers in February, 1935. Wilczynski, Dumping and Central Planning, 74 J. POL. ECON. 250
(1966).
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method. It also reviews approaches used by the EEC and other countries.
The article then extensively analyzes the problems with the U.S. law, and
proposes solutions.
I. Background
A. U.S. LAW BEFORE 1979
1. Treasury Decisions-Development of the Rationale
The fair value calculation in the Antidumping Act of 19212 was adopted
without specific regard for the special problems of determining the foreign
market value of merchandise in nonmarket economy (NME) countries. This
shortcoming in the original Act was recognized by the Treasury Department
as early as 1960. 3 In Bicycles from Czechoslovakia,4 the first NME dumping
case to result in a determination of sales at less than fair value, the Treasury
Department adopted the practice of referring to the domestic or export
prices of similar articles manufactured in non-Communist market countries
as the best evidence available of fair value. In Jalousie-Louvre-Sized Sheet-
glass from Czechoslovakia,5 the Treasury Department reaffirmed this prac-
tice by refusing to rely on the price of NME exports to other countries. A
year later, in Portland Cement from Poland,6 Treasury concluded that home
market sales of NME imports did not qualify as sales "in the ordinary course
of trade," as required by section 205(a) of the Antidumping Act of 1921.
Indeed, in this cement case, Treasury relied upon the prices of West Euro-
pean cement exported to the U.S. as the basis for fair value. Since cement is
usually priced uniformly within any single market, it is not surprising that
Treasury found no dumping when comparing one export price to the U.S.
with another.
This practice of using market-economy prices as a surrogate foreign-
market value was formally adopted as Customs Regulation section 153.5
(b) 7 which stated:
Merchandise from controlled-economy country: Ordinarily, if the information
available indicates that the economy of the country from which the merchandise is
exported is controlled to an extent that sales or offers of sales of such or similar
merchandise in that country or countries other than the United States does not
permit a determination of fair value under section 153.3 or section 153.4, the
Secretary will determine fair value on the basis of the constructed value of the
2. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160 et seq. (1976).
3. The authors have been unable to ascertain how fair value was measured in a 1953-54 case
involving East German potash in which no injury was found. 19 Fed. Reg. 8,020 (1954).
4. 25 Fed. Reg. 5,657 (1960).
5. 27 Fed. Reg. 8,457 (1962).
6. 28 Fed. Reg. 6,660 (1963).
7. 19 C.F.R. § 153.5(b) (1973).
VOL. 18, NO. 4
SYMPOSIUM/ANTIDUMPING: U.S. AND EEC 809
merchandise determined under normal costs, expenses, and profits as reflected by
the prices at which such or similar merchandise is sold by a non-state-controlled-
economy country either (1) for consumption in its own markets; or (2) to other
countries, including the United States.
A special problem was presented by cases involving imports from Yugo-
slavia-a country which claimed to have worker control rather than state
control of individual enterprises, and (perhaps more importantly) with
which the U.S. had maintained friendly ties since Tito's break with Stalin.
Throughout the 1960s, Treasury generally relied upon Yugoslav home
market prices to calculate foreign-market value. That treatment of Yugosla-
via as a market economy was made more explicit in the case of Animal Glue
and Inedible Gelatin from Yugoslavia.8 The Treasury Department deter-
mined that Yugoslavia was not a state-controlled-economy country because
(1) there was an established buying rate for Yugoslav currency; (2) the
Customs Service could verify all information submitted by the Yugoslav
government and manufacturer; and (3) at least for this product, the Yugo-
slav home market prices reflected the economic forces of supply and de-
mand.
It is interesting to note that in coming to this conclusion, Treasury looked
to both the market characteristics of the economy as a whole as well as of the
particular commercial situation of the product under investigation. By
examining the issues of currency convertibility and verifiability of informa-
tion, Treasury was scrutinizing the country's monetary policies and its
commercial sector's methods of recordkeeping in the ordinary course of
business. By looking at the underlying supply and demand relationships,
Treasury appeared to be viewing both country-wide factor and demand
conditions as well as sector-specific determinants of prices for animal glue.
Yugoslavia was ruled not to be an NME because it possessed a satisfactory
amount of "market" characteristics at both the country and industry levels.
2. 1974 Trade Act
While the technical problem of measuring alleged dumping from nonmar-
ket economies was raised in numerous cases since 1954, the issue itself was
not significant in terms of overall trade policy. Total volume of trade from
these countries remained low as only Poland and Yugoslavia had most-
favored-nation (MFN) trading status. 9 The remaining NMEs were subject
to prohibitive Column 2 tariffs which were often 200-300% higher than their
Column 1 equivalents. Total exports to the U.S. from the Soviet Union in
1972, for example, were only $95.5 million, of which the largest single item
was platinum (approximately 47% of imports).
8. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,288 (Aug. 3, 1977).
9. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 251, 76 Stat. 879 (1962) (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 1887 (1982)).
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The Nixon Administration's policy of detente, and negotiations in 1972
towards an MFN agreement with the Soviet Union (which was never
ratified), raised Congressional concerns that import relief for American
industries would be sacrificed to foreign policy considerations. Conse-
quently, the 1974 Trade Act, which sets out the provisions under which
MFN treatment can be granted to Communist countries, also included two
provisions dealing specifically with relief for domestic industries from im-
ports from NMEs. These were section 205(c) of the Antidumping Act 0 and
section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974."
a. Section 205(b)-A response to Congressional fear
of executive branch discretion
In section 321(d) of the 1974 Trade Act, Congress incorporated Customs
Regulation section 153.5(b) into the Antidumping Act, using substantially
identical language. Congress thus transformed into a statutory requirement
that which had been an interpretive regulation issued as an act of administra-
tive discretion. Apparently, Chairman Wilbur Mills of the Ways and Means
Committee feared possible abuse of Executive Branch discretion in the
then-current atmosphere of detente. The House Report explained the pur-
pose of the amendment as follows:
A new subsection (c) to section 205 is also added to adopt in the law the substance
of the existing Treasury Department practice, as reflected in section 153.5(b) of
the Treasury's antidumping regulations (19 C.F.R. 153.5(b)) ... The amendment
would confirm the Treasury practice under which the Secretary makes the neces-
sary dumping determinations with respect to state-controlled-economy countries
based on prices at which such or similar merchandise of a non-state-controlled-
economy country is sold either for consumption in its home market or to other
countries, or based on the constructive value of such or similar merchandise in a
non-state-controlled-economy country.1 2
Congress, by placing the language of section 153.5(b) into the statute,
ratified the Treasury practice which had developed during the previous
fifteen years and significantly diminished the possibility of the adoption of an
alternative methodology to solve this conceptually difficult issue.
b. Section 406-An alternate remedy
At the same time, the Congress added section 406 of the 1974 Trade Act, a
separate safeguard provision aimed only at nonmarket Communist coun-
tries. Section 406 provided for relief from rapidly increasing imports from a
10. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 321,88 Stat. 2043 (1978) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 160 (1976)).
11. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 406, 88 Stat. 2062 (1978) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2436 (1976)).
12. H. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1973).
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Communist country or countries, without regard to the fairness/unfairness
of that trade. This approach had been foreshadowed by a "market-
disruption" clause in the 1972 proposed U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade agreement.
13
Relief under this section was made subject to Presidential discretion and
Congressional review. One stated purpose of section 406 was to provide a
remedy for nonmarket economy imports in view of Congressional recogni-
tion that the antidumping laws could not be effectively applied to these
imports. 14
c. The Polish Golf Car Case
The next major development in the evolution of the U.S. antidumping
law as it was applied to NME products came from the case brought against
golf cars from Poland. Golf cars were produced in Poland solely for export
to the U.S. There was no domestic market nor sales to other countries.
Initially, Treasury relied upon the home-market prices of a Canadian
producer to establish foreign-market value.' 5 When the Canadian producer
went out of business in 1975, Treasury suddenly had to find a new standard
for fair value upon which to base assessment of duties under the continuing
order. 16 Although there was production of golf cars in Mexico, Italy, Japan
and other countries, the only other large-scale producers were in the U.S.
In late 1977, in order to avoid using U.S. prices or costs for fair value,
Treasury developed a method for determining "constructed value" based
upon the Polish state-owned company's physical inputs (verified by Trea-
sury at the Polish factory) valued at prices prevailing in Spain-a country
determined by Treasury to be at a comparable level of economic develop-
ment to Poland. The choice of Spain as the home-market surrogate arose
from a study of Spain's economy prepared for Treasury by the Polish state
trading company which was the respondent in the case. Based upon the
public record, it is unclear what charges were made for capital costs and
other indirect costs in the calculation.
The proposed use of this novel definition of fair value was discussed with
the Poles during the visit of President Jimmy Carter to Warsaw in late
1977.17 This approach was formally proposed as a Treasury regulation in
January, 1978.18
13. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding Trade, May 29, 1972, Art. 3.
14. Trade Act of 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 210 (1974).
15. Electric Golf Cars from Poland; Antidumping, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,497 (1975).
16. U.S. International Trade Commission Publication 1069, Electric Golf Cars from Poland
at A-4 (June 1980).
17. See Note, Dumping from "Controlled Economy" Countries: The Polish Golf Cart Case,
11 LAW & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 777 (1979).
18. Antidumping: Proposed Amendments Pertaining to Merchandise from State-Controlled-
Economy Countries, 43 Fed. Reg. 1,356 (1978).
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d. 1978 Treasury Regulations
When proposed, these regulations generated an unusually large volume
of critical comment both from Capitol Hill and from interested parties
outside the government. Commentators representing domestic producers
were critical of the "comparable economy" concept, the "factors of produc-
tion" approach, and the resort to contructed value when there existed an
actual sales price for such or similar merchandise (albeit sales by U.S.
producers in the U.S. market). They argued that Congressional ratification
of the longstanding Treasury Department practice of disregarding prices
and costs in state-controlled-economy countries implied a Congressional
judgment that price and cost relationships as expressed in the particular
combination of factors of production in state-controlled-economy countries
should not be considered comparable to those in market economies.
Despite the expression of strong disagreement from a variety of interests,
on August 9, 1978 the Treasury Department adopted its new approach
essentially as proposed. 19 The new regulation amended Section 153.7 of the
Customs Regulations to provide for a new way to calculate the constructed
value of merchandise produced in a state-controlled-economy country
where such or similar merchandise is not produced in a market economy
other than in the U.S. This type of constructed value calculation reflects the
hypothetical market-economy cost of production of the merchandise under
investigation if produced by the exact methods and processes used in the
NME country.
The market economy used as the surrogate is that which is deemed to be at
a comparable level of economic development as the nonmarket country. In
other words, the actual input units needed to make a unit of merchandise are
measured in the NME country (hours of labor, kilowatts of electricity, tons
of each input of raw materials, etc.). These are then "priced" in a market-
economy country deemed to be comparable in developmental terms. The
sum of these hypothetical costs plus a mark-up for overhead and profit
becomes the fair value. Because this exercise involves data from two foreign
countries, verification of data must occur in both the NME country and in
the market-economy country chosen as the surrogate.
e. Disposition of the Polish Golf Car Case
Oddly enough, the new 1978 dumping regulations fashioned to alleviate
the "Polish problem" were never directly applied in the golf car case. In
spring 1980, the Commerce Department wrote a letter to the International
19. Antidumping Investigation Procedures Under Antidumping Act, 1921 43 Fed. Reg. 35,
262, 35,265 (1978). An antidumping petition on lightbulbs from Hungary had been filed on June
21, 1978. Lightbulbs from Hungary, 43 Fed. Reg. 34,851 (1978).
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Trade Commission implying that this new regulation would be applied to
golf car imports after August 9, 1978 (U.S. prices would be used for 1976-78
entries) and furthermore, that under this approach no dumping margins
would be found. The ITC subsequently issued a "no injury" finding termi-
nating the order.2 0 These speculations were conveyed to the ITC without the
formalities of an investigation, verification, hearing or any meaningful
participation of the domestic parties.
B. THE 1979 AcT
In the process of adopting the 1978 regulations, the Treasury Department
had gone as far as possible in interpreting section 205(c) of the Antidumping
Act. Influential members of Congress and interested parties in the domestic
private sector remained highly critical of the Treasury approach which they
considered potentially vulnerable to abuse of discretion for foreign policy
motives.
Congressional skepticism of the Treasury Department's 1978 regulations
is evident in the legislative history of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.21
This statute reenacted in substance section 205(c) of the Antidumping Act
of 1921 as section 773(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. The initial
inclination of the House Ways and Means Committee was to include lan-
guage in its Report disapproving the Customs regulations on NME dump-
ing, but Treasury Department officials prevailed on the Committee to adopt
a more neutral "wait-and-see" approach. Thus, the Report of the Commit-
tee on Ways and Means comments on section 773(c) were as follows:
Although this report contains the general caveat that this bill is intended to
implement only those changes in domestic law which are considered necessary or
appropriate to make U.S. law consistent with the international agreements and is
not intended as a general expression of approval of current regulations or adminis-
trative practice, the Committee believes it is necessary to emphasize the specific
application of that caveat to the current law on dumping from non-market eco-
nomy countries. The reenactment of current statutory provisions on this subject is
not an expression of congressional approval or disapproval of the regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury on August 9, 1978 (43 Fed. Reg. 35,
262).22
The same language was placed in the Senate Finance Committee report.2 3
20. U.S. International Trade Commission Publication 1069, Electric Golf Cars from Poland
at A-51 (June 1980).
21. See The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, S. Rep. No. 249,96th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted
in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 381 et seq.
22. H. REP. No. 96-317,96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 76-77 (1979) The underscored language was
added following Treasury intervention.
23. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 96, reprinted
in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 381 482.
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C. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES' AND OTHER COUNTRIES' PRACTICES
The European Communities (EC) handle the problem of NME dumping
under Article 2 of their Antidumping Regulations. 24 Under EC antidump-
ing procedures, the imports' value is compared to the so-called "normal
value" to see if there is dumping. For NME imports, the normal value of the
product is based on:
(a) the price at which the like product of a market economy third country is
actually sold:
(i) for consumption on the domestic market of that country, or
(ii) to other countries, including the Community; or
(b) the constructed value of the like product in a market economy third country;
or
(c) if neither price nor constructed value as established under (a) or (b) above
provides an adequate basis, the price actually paid or payable in the Commun-
ity for the like product, duly adjusted, if necessary, to include a reasonable
profit margin.
If the imports are from non-GATT countries, the EC has the ability to
employ "special measures" under Article 16 of the same Regulation in order
to determine the appropriate normal value.
Because of the proximity of Eastern and Western Europe and their
historical trading relationship, NME trade is more substantial with Western
Europe than with the U.S. These same historical relationships also lead to
some unusual applications of the law. For example, since trade between
East Germany and West Germany is considered "internal", no antidumping
actions can be brought against East German products which are sold in the
West German market. Still, in order to prevent West Germany from acting
as a transition point for East German goods en route to other EC countries,
any other member state can bring an antidumping action against East
German goods.
1. Review of EC Experience
The EC practice in this area has been summarized recently by H.-F.
Beseler and N. Williams (the administrators of the EC antidumping law):
The Commission's practice, therefore, is to consider any substitute third country
which may be suggested in the initial stage of the investigation, thereby ensuring
that no possible analogue is excluded from examination. Thus, the Community
industry is free to base the allegation of dumping in th complaint on any third
market economy price or cost to which it has access. Providing the comparision is
considered reasonable enough to justify the opening of an investigation, the
analogue suggested is published in the notice of opening of the investigation. This
gives other interested parties the opportunity to make any representations they
wish on the proposed analogue and to suggest a more appropriate choice if one is
known. If alternative analogues are proposed then these are considered by the
24. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/79, 20.12.79., Art. 2.
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Commission and may be accepted as being more reasonable or appropriate. In any
event, whatever analogue is finally accepted the Commission publishes notice of
the fact together with the reasons for the choice.
This pragmatic approach results in the consideration of a far wider range of
alternatives than would otherwise have been the case. Thus, for the 23 products
originating in state trading countries in which the investigation was terminated in
the years 1980 to 1982, the normal value was based on prices or costs in 12
countries at all stages of economic development from India and Yugoslavia to
Sweden and the United States. An idea of the Commission's open-minded
approach in this matter may be demonstrated from the fact that only 11 of the 23
analogues finally chosen were those contained in the complaint, 10 being changed
as a result of representations by other interested parties and 2 by the Commission
in the light of evidence which came to light during the investigation. The reasons
given for the choice of the analogue finally selected include, similarity of the scale
of production and production techniques; similarity of access to raw materials;
price controls ensured that prices in the substitute country were not unreasonably
high; the low level of protection afforded to the domestic industry in the country
chosen; insuffiency of data available on the country originally suggested and the
fact that the additional administrative burden of carrying out an investigation in a
further country was not justified. 25
2. Reliance on Price Undertakings to Offset Injury
Between 1968 and 1982, the EC completed two hundred thirty-three
antidumping investigations of which eighty-two involved products from
Comecon (other than Yugoslavia). Of these, sixty were ended after "under-
takings or similar solutions". The remaining twenty-two were ended before
completion. Price undertakings are confidential agreements between the
Commission and the foreign exporter to raise their prices to the EC to a
degree determined sufficient by the Commission to offset injury.
Authority to put into effect safeguard provisions with regard to imports
from NME countries was embedded in two recent EC Agreements. The
1974 draft Agreements between the EC and Comecon countries (which
were never implemented) stated that safeguard provisions would be trig-
gered when imported products from these countries were sold at prices
lower than those which would prevail under competitive market conditions
(termed the "actual value"). The 1978 Trade Agreement between the EC
and the People's Republic of China (PRC) states that "trade in goods and
the provision of services ... shall be effected at market-related prices and
rates."26
3. Reliance on Other Trade Measures
The EC on the whole is more aggressive than the U.S. in protecting its
industry from injury caused by "unfairly" traded goods with respect to NME
25. H.-F. Beseler & N. Williams, from an unpublished manuscript at 18, 19 (Footnotes
omitted).
26. Trade Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the People's
Republic of China, Art. 7.
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imports. For example, as described above, in its only trade agreement with a
NME country (China), the EC has obtained a specific commitment that
Chinese exports to the EC will be at market-related prices. This is a much
stronger commitment to domestic industry protection than the weak ex-
hortation in the U.S.-PRC Trade Agreement to "consult" if there is market
disruption. The main mechanism for indigenous industry protection within
the EC is still protective quotas. The current booklet of quotas lists more
than 1,500 separate quotas applicable to NME exports to the EC. Beyond
that, the EC antidumping regulations permit the administrative authority to
use essentially any price as the standard for dumping by NMEs without
agonizing over the level of economic development in a surrogate country or
hypothetical factors of production. As a last resort, the EC regulations
permit the use of the internal EC price-after it has been adjusted upwards
to eliminate any price supressive influence of the NME imports. This adjust-
ment, consequently, can ensure that the EC producer earns a reasonable
profit.
4. Canada and Other Countries
The Canadian law, like that of the EC, adopts a much more flexible
approach to dealing with alleged dumped imports from NMEs than that
under U.S. law. Section 7 of the Canadian Antidumping Act merely states
that if the country of export has a government which monopolizes its export
trade or substantially distorts domestic prices, the "normal value" ". . . shall
be determined in such manner as the Minister (of Finance) prescribes."
Since Canadian dumping decisions generally say little about the underlying
methodology employed in reaching the decision, little is publicly known as
to how this Ministerial discretion has been employed. In at least one case,
Electrical Generating Machinery from the USSR, the Canadians calculated
fair value by simply assuming the Soviet price to Canada to be a certain
(high) percentage less than fair value.2 7
The Canadians have proposed new legislation and regulations to imple-
ment the 1979 GATT Antidumping Code and incorporate it into domestic
Canadian Law. In the proposed package of laws and regulations, their
approach to NME dumping essentially parallels that of the EC.2s
The Australian approach to NME dumping is contained in Article 5 of the
Australian Antidumping Act (1975). In this Article, Australian authoritites
are given great latitude in setting the normal value. The only constraint is
that the Minister of Finance must try to use prices of like goods sold in a
market country where the other country's costs of production are similar to
27. K. Stegemann, The Net National Burden of Canadian Antidumping Policy, 15 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 301 (1982).
28. Dept. of Finance, Canada, Proposals on Import Policy (July 1980).
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those in the NME. Here, like in the U.S. regulations, some attention is paid
to gross economic characteristics of the surrogate for the NME, although
there is nothing here approaching the baroque hierarchy of choices found in
the U.S. regulations.
II. Problems With Current U.S. Law
A. GENERAL
1. Results Are Unpredictable
The current procedures contain a high degree of uncertainty and possibil-
ity for abuse. Importers cannot predict which country will be chosen as a
surrogate for the nonmarket economy, and thus cannot possibly set their
prices to assure compliance with the dumping laws. At the same time,
domestic producers, who usually rely on the dumping law because it con-
tains no provision for political input, instead find that the determination of
their cases can rest solely on the administering authority's choice of a
"comparable country" or constructed value-a choice which could well be
made on the basis of foreign policy considerations extraneous to the merits
of the case. (Under the standard of judicial review requiring substantial
evidence in the record, the administering authority could make almost any
choice of surrogate country stand up in court.)
2. Time Deadlines Too Short
One practical problem which has become apparent in nonmarket-
economy cases is that such cases are subject to the same deadlines as
market-economy antidumping cases. In the nonmarket-economy country
case, however, in addition to all the other steps required in any antidumping
investigation, there are several preliminary phases which must be com-
pleted. First, a decision must be made and evidence placed on the record to
show that the product involved is from a country which is determined to be
state-controlled to an extent that sales do not permit the calculation of fair
value. Second, the decision must be made as to the identification of the
appropriate surrogate countries (again, always mindful to generate suf-
ficient evidence to support the choice on the record). This decision involves
an often complex analysis of the exporting country and the role and impor-
tance of the particular producing sector to the economy as a whole. Similar
analyses are performed on an array of potential surrogate candidates. Third,
once a surrogate country is identified, the administering authority must try
to obtain the agreement of the government and of a producer or producers
in that surrogate country to answer the antidumping price and/or cost
questionnaires. Only after those lengthy procedures have been completed
can the "normal" part of an antidumping investigation (sending the ques-
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tionnaire, obtaining a reply, analyzing the results, calculating a margin) be
completed.
3. Unfair to Other Trading Partners?
The alleged failure to adequately control NME dumping in this country is
also a source of potential friction with our traditional trading partners.
Permitting nonmarket importers to compete by means of artificially low
prices, while free market nations are subjected to our dumping and counter-
vailing duty laws, is inconsistent with this country's commitment to non-
discriminatory trade policies and unfair to those of our trading partners who
have agreed to play by the free-market rules. Thus, for example, producers
of Indian castings (which are subject to a countervailing duty order) 29 have
complained that the People's Republic of China (PRC) can sell castings in
the U.S. at prices far below those of Indian castings without suffering a
similar penalty, while a case brought in 1982 against mushrooms from the
PRC (which led to a finding of no dumping),° would have provided more
benefit to Taiwanese exporters than to U.S. producers if it had resulted in an
affirmative finding.
B. USE OF NONMARKET ECONOMY'S HOME MARKET
PRICES AND COSTS
1. Unreliability of NME Prices and Costs
With respect to NMEs, it is generally conceded that home-market prices
and costs are meaningless as a source of "fair value." 3' l The heavy interven-
tion of the government in the setting of relative prices means that the
ultimate prices and costs in NMEs reflect political, economic, or bureaucra-
tic factors rather than local supply and demand. World-market prices are
not decisive factors in a typical NME production function as the internal
economy enjoys sufficient isolation from the world economy to effectively
insulate its producers from these economic forces.
A legitimate question can be raised as to how reliable home-market prices
and costs are in some sectors of market economies-especially when dealing
with sectors (e.g., steel, agriculture) where there is heavy government
influence. So far, Treasury and Commerce have taken the position that the
overall market orientation of those economies provides sufficient commer-
29. Certain Iron-Metal Castings from India, 46 Fed. Reg. 3,302 (1981).
30. Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Canned Mushrooms from the
People's Republic of China, 48 Fed. Reg. 45,445 (1983).
31. See Soltysinski, The Application of U. S. Antidumping and Other Foreign Trade Competi-
tion Laws to the So-Called State-Controlled Economy Enterprises in INTERFACE Two: CONFER-
ENCE PROCEEDINGS ON THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF EAST-WEST TRADE 169 (Wallace and Flores
eds. 1982).
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cial yardsticks to permit a valid measurement for use in antidumping or
countervailing duty cases. No further analysis of this issue has been under-
taken.
2. Currency Convertibility
Indeed, even if Commerce could measure a "real" home-market price or
cost in a nonmarket economy, they would have to find a way around the
inconvertibility of all NME currencies (except perhaps the Hungarian
forint). While various methods have been suggested for calculating "sha-
dow" exchange rates for these currencies, those methods appear to be best
suited for academic discussion of their economies. There is nowhere near
sufficient consensus to permit the use of any one method for the decision of
actual cases. Without an accurate notion of the exchange rate which would
be applied in a case, neither domestic producers nor NME producers can
know what import price would be considered "fair" under these statutes.
C. USE OF NONMARKET ECONOMY'S EXPORT PRICES
The fact that NME producers face a nonconvertible currency can be a
primary incentive to dump (to the extent that the notion of "dumping" is
truly meaningful in a NME context), For example, earning precious hard
currency to pay for imports, meet scheduled debt payments or to gain access
to locally produced goods allocated by quotas elevates the importance of
gaining sales in hard currency countries. Thus the need for hard currency
which may cause dumping in the U.S. market is also likely to create the
incentive to export at artificially low prices to other countries.
As noted above, Treasury rejected the use of NME export prices for
establishing fair value in the 1950s. Commerce, most recently, rejected this
approach in the case involving Romanian carbon steel plate in 1982.32 The
EC has also refused to use the nonmarket economy export prices to other
markets as a measure for normal value presumably for the same reasons as
the U.S.
D. USE OF A SURROGATE COUNTRY'S HOME
MARKET PRICES OR COSTS
1. Overview and Theory
The first choice for the determination of fair value in an NME antidump-
ing case is the prices or costs of similar merchandise produced in a market
32. Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Carbon Steel Plate from
Romania, 47 Fed. Reg. 35,666 (1982); Carbon Steel Plate from Romania; Suspension of
Investigation, 48 Fed. Reg. 317 (1983).
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country deemed to be at a comparable level of economic development.
Current Commerce Department regulations give little guidance as to how
this comparability actually is to be determined. The regulations simply
instruct the administering authority to find a market-economy country with
approximately the same level GNP per capita and similar overall economic
structure.
33
The underlying theoretical basis for this quest for economic comparability
rests in the belief that, but for the nonmarket character of the economy, the
NME producer would have the same costs and sell at the same prices as
producers in market countries with the same level of GNP per capita. Thus,
these surrogate producers' prices and costs are the fair value for the NME
producers' exports to the U.S.
Although this approach is a good attempt at addressing a nearly impossi-
ble problem, it falls short of its goal of mirroring what the fair value in the
NME might be if it were measureable. This approach is weakened both by
the way it defines comparability and by the implicit assumptions as to the
role of the particular export industry in the economy as a whole.
On the first issue, the determination of overall comparability based on
GNP per capita is particularly inappropriate when comparing a market
economy with a NME. The biggest difficulty is in arriving at reliable
measurements of macroeconomic values. 34 There is no indication that
somehow the shakiness of NME prices and costs at the microeconomic level
disappear through aggregation. Indeed heavily used statistical sources such
as the World Bank explicitly caution against this type of cross-national
comparisons. 3
The second problem reflects the relationship of the producer to the
country as a whole. Even if the perfect market-economy substitute at the
macroeconomic level were to be found, the surrogate producer analysis
would still be flawed. This is because the exporting industry is frequently an
exceptional industry even within its own country. Often it has been nurtured
in its development and "force-fed" capital in order to maximize its ability to
generate hard currency.
Thus, the nonmarket industry will frequently be as large and technically
sophisticated as those in far more developed countries-precisely because
the state in NMEs will support capacity expansion and technological invest-
ment concentrated in this particular sector far in excess of what private
investors would be expected to underwrite. For example, in the Polish Golf
Car case, the Polish state aviation enterprise in the early 1970's developed a
golf car facility oriented toward large volume production with the sole aim of
33. 19 C.F.R. § 353.8 (1983).
34. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
35. THE WORLD BANK, 1980 WORLD BANK ATLAS 16 (1980).
VOL. 18, NO. 4
SYMPOSIUM/ANTIDUMPING: U.S. AND EEC 821
exporting golf cars to the United States. It would be highly unusual for a
similar investment pattern to develop in a market economy at a similar level
of development.
2. Administrability
Once a comparable country which produces such or similar merchandise
to that under investigation is identified the job is far from over. Numerous
practical difficulties evolve from Commerce's need to seek confidential
business data from producers in countries not directly involved in these
cases. Procedurally, a two-step process is followed. First, the government of
the country chosen as surrogate must give permission to the U.S. govern-
ment to approach that country's producers. Second, the producers them-
selves must be willing to cooperate. In the case involving Romanian carbon
steel plate in 1982, for example, several countries refused to allow the U.S.
Government such access to their producers. This is understandable espe-
cially if there is a chance the U.S. industry might file a case against the
surrogate producers at a future time.
36
Even when the host government is agreeable, Commerce must still find
producers willing to open their books to U.S. government investigators. In
most cases, from the surrogate producer's perspective, there is not much
commercial benefit associated with cooperation while the risk and expenses
to the producer of cooperation can be high. In the extreme case, such
surrogate producer reluctance can become the dominant factor in the inves-
tiation. Thus, for example, in the 1982-83 case involving Chinese shop
towels, Commerce pursued leads throughout numerous countries (Pakis-
tan, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Dominican Republic and Colombia) to no avail.
With two days left before the statutory deadline for the preliminary deter-
mination, Commerce was forced to rely on the average price of all imports
into the U.S. (based on Census data) as the basis for fair value for lack of
better information. 37 Similarly, in a recent preliminary determination con-
cerning chloropicrin from the People's Republic of China, Commerce was
forced to use Japanese data from the petition as the best information
available even though it was explicitly noted that such information was
inappropriate as a basis for fair value. 38
Another technical problem has arisen because of the lack of "fit" of NME
cases into the regulations governing access to confidential information
under administrative protective order. In a normal (i.e., market economy)
36. See Shop Towels of Cotton from The People's Republic of China, 48 Fed. Reg. 37,055
(1983) and Cotton Shop Towels from Pakistan, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,187 (1983).
37. Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Shop Towels of Cotton
from The People's Republic of China, 48 Fed. Reg. 12,764 (1983).
38. Chloropicrin from The People's Republic of China, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,798 (1983).
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antidumping case, the refusal of a respondent to supply data which is
releaseable under an administrative protective order would lead to the
possible return of its submission and the use of best information available-
usually the petitioner's information. In NME cases, a producer in a surro-
gate country supplies the relevant foreign-market value data. The refusal of
the surrogate producers to permit access of the petitioning and NME parties
to the confidential data could never lead to any sanctions against those
surrogate producers since they are only participating in the matter ex gratia.
Nor can Commerce afford to force the issue, since if the surrogate producer
withdrew his data in the course of their investigation, Commerce would
once again find itself on "square one" with no useful information to analyze
and little time left before a statutorily mandated decision. For example, in
the 1982-83 case concerning Chinese print cloth, the possibility was raised
that a dumping margin could be calculated based upon surrogate producers'
data without being able to show either party how the margin was calcu-
lated.39
Another oddity in these cases was revealed by the "twin" cases of Potas-
sium Permanganate from China and Spain.4 o Technically, the two investiga-
tions were separate, and the home-market data furnished by the Spanish
respondents for use in the Spanish case could not be used as a surrogate for
Chinese foreign-market value without the express permission of the Spanish
respondents even though dependence upon this data made the most sense
from an administrative as well as a commercial point of view.
3. Adjustments for Non-Comparable Surrogate
When Commerce is unable to find a country with a "comparable" market
economy which produces the merchandise under investigation, prices or
costs in a non-comparable market economy can be used (assuming Com-
merce can locate a producer willing to cooperate with the U.S. government)
after adjustment for known differences in prices and costs. 41 While this
exercise has never been done, its administration poses a bit of a mystery. If
prices and costs inside the NME are unreliable by definition (which is why
they are unusable to begin with), how can there be known differences in
these costs for which allowance can be made? The concept of a "difference"
implies both values are measurable. Since the non-measurability of NME
prices and costs are precisely the cause of the original methodological
difficulty, it is absurd to assume that some measurement of difference can be
derived with a greater amount of accuracy.
39. Griege Polyester/Cotton Printcloth from The People's Republic of China, 48 Fed. Reg.
41,249 (1983).
40. See Potassium Permanganate from Spain; Initiation of Antidumping Investigation, 48
Fed. Reg. 11,481 (1983) and Potassium Permanganate from the People's Republic of China;
Initiation of Antidumping Investigation, 48 Fed. Reg. 11,482 (1983).
41. 19 C.F.R. § 353.8 (1983).
VOL. 18, NO. 4
SYMPOSIUM/ANTIDUMPING: U.S. AND EEC 823
E. USE OF U.S. PRICE
1. Price of Other Country Exports to U.S.
While the regulations explicitly authorize the Commerce Department to
use a U.S. market-based price when other actual price and cost data are
unavailable, Commerce and its predecessor, Treasury, have generally been
reluctant to do so. This, in part, reflects the fear that direct reliance upon a
competitor's U.S. pricing might encourage that competitor to alter its
commercial behavior in order to sustain or increase a dumping margin on
NME exports to the U.S. after the imposition of an order. It also reflects, in
part, the belief at the investigations phase that competing market-economy
sales in the U.S. might be priced lower than they otherwise would be as the
result of NME dumping. In the case of menthol from the PRC, for example,
Commerce used the Paraguayan export price to the U.S. only after Com-
merce was satisfied that the New York and London menthol markets moved
in unison (presumably limiting the effect of possible Chinese dumping in the
U.S. though not world wide).42
The use of third-country imports to the U.S. does have a distinct advan-
tage over the use of U.S. producers' data (as described below) for there must
be significant U.S. industry (or else there is no investigation, since injury to a
U.S. industry must be shown) which will moderate the foreign market-
economy producer's market power in the U.S. In many respects, the surro-
gate foreign producer is in much the same position as the NME producer
trying to stay competitive with the U.S. industry while overcoming trans-
portation costs and tariff barriers which add to the minimum acceptable
price.
Indeed, in situations where there is significant import competition in the
U.S. market, the imported price (adjusted back to the ex-factory level) is
probably one of the best measures of fair value as it generally allows
continued NME access to the U.S. market while disallowing price undercut-
ting. Like other surrogate-based measures of fair value, it ignores any 'true'
comparative advantage which might be held by NME producers as well as
their penchant for pursuing a low-price entry strategy in order to secure an
initial market position. (The need to pursue that strategy is not, by any
means, solely an NME approach to U.S. marketing, however).
2. Price of U.S. Produced Goods Sold in U.S.
The degree to which use of U.S. producers' prices as fair value encourages
anticompetitive results depends in large part on the amount of competition
experienced among U.S. producers and the market share held by the NME
producer. Should fair value be pegged to an individual producer's U.S.
42. Antidumping, Natural Menthol from the People's Republic of China; Final Determina-
tion of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,614 (1981).
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prices in a very competitive market, this would minimize the danger that the
NME producer would be foreclosed from the market by U.S. industry price
rises aimed at creating large dumping margins. No U.S. producer would be
likely to raise their price to an uncompetitive level in order to force out NME
competition for they would risk losing their market share as well (unless the
price was pegged to the industry price leader). If, on the other hand, U.S.
producers were few in number and there was no significant third-country
import competition, the antidumping law could be used by the petitioners as
a way to eliminate competition from NME sources. This problem is exacer-
bated by the way in which an NME dumping margin is calculated under
current law. That is, the ex-factory price of the imported NME merchandise
is compared to the ex-factory price of the U.S.-made goods. If the NME
producer adopted a policy of strictly matching the prevailing U.S. price, it
would always be dumping by the excess of its costs of transport, handling
and duty on the sale to the U.S. over those of the domestic producer.43
The other instance where the anticompetitive aspects of use of a U.S.
producers' price would be a concern is the situation where the NME had
captured a significant portion of the U.S. market. By forcing the NME
producer to parallel its pricing to a U.S. producer, the number of indepen-
dent competitors has been diminished, for the NME producer has lost his
pricing autonomy. This is anticompetitive to the extent that the NME was a
significant factor in the U.S. market prior to the antidumping case.
A U.S. based price has a significant advantage over other current surro-
gate-based methods in one respect-it is a price with which the NME
producer can be expected to have reasonable familiarity. In commercial
terms, this is very important. Many NME producers claim they could be
very competitive in the U.S. market without violating the antidumping laws
if only they could know what would be considered a "fair" price. It is not
"fair", nor is it commercially reasonable, to expect an NME producer to be
familiar with the home-market price of a similar product in Finland or
Paraguay or some other country which Commerce may decide ex post facto
is the appropriate surrogate. It is even less reasonable to expect him to know
the cost of production of a similar product in some unidentified third
country. In effect, the U.S. is expecting the NME producer not only to know
his product's price around the world but also to keep track of all of the prices
of the inputs in the production function around the world. This uncertainty
of methodology is a trade barrier in and of itself.
43. I.e., if those costs were $10, and the U.S. producer's ex-factory price were $30 and its
transport/handling costs in the U.S. were $5, and both producers sold in the U.S. market at $35,
the "foreign market value" for the NME producer's would be $30 (the U.S. producer's
ex-factory price), and the NME producers' "U.S. price" would be $25, for a $5 dumping
margin.
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F. USE OF A HYPOTHETICAL CONSTRUCTED VALUE
IN A SURROGATE COUNTRY
1. Overview of Theory
As described in Section I (A), above, Treasury in the Polish Golf Car case
was anxious to avoid the use of the U.S. producer's price and cost experi-
ence as the basis for fair value. In its place, Treasury created a new method-
ology for determining the constructed value by valuing the physical inputs
plus general expenses, labor and profit (but not capital) actually employed in
the production of the product in the NME at prices in a "comparable"
market economy. It is an approach which has some positive aspects, the
most notable of which is ease of administration (since it does not require the
giving of confidential data to the Commerce Department by anybody except
the NME respondent). But, contrary to statements of its proponents, such a
hypothetical exercise does not capture the comparative advantage of the
NME through the use of its productive function. Any comparative advan-
tage is obscured when the NME's production function is superimposed upon
the array of prices from another country.
2. Problems in Approach
a. Difficulties in Choosing the "Right" Surrogate
The most obvious difficulty involves selecting the "right" surrogate.
Indeed, for this exercise, a truly correct surrogate is not likely to exist. The
macroeconomic comparability implied by the current selection process
(which relies on per capita GNP, relative distribution of economic activity
among sectors, and so on) does not mean that countries which look the same
on the "macro" level will have the same set of relative prices. Relative prices
are critical in determining the input mix in a production process. Compara-
tive advantage reflects unique physical endowments as well as developed
expertise, not macroeconomic sameness. These endowments and expertises
are reflected in relative price arrays. Indeed, the bulk of our trade in
manufactured goods is with other developed countries. Most of this trade
would not exist if prices in countries. of the same level of development were
the same.
This simulation does not capture comparative advantage. Comparative
advantage is reflected in the NME's production function which would
emphasize those production characteristics in which the NME has an advan-
tage. If, for example, energy is exceptionally plentiful and therefore rel-
atively cheap compared to other inputs, the producer would be likely to
produce his product in a way which minimizes total cost by maximizing
energy use and reducing other inputs accordingly. This "comparative
advantage" of cheap, abundant energy would only be captured in a hypothe-
tical constructed value analysis if the chosen surrogate had the exact same
FALL 1984
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relative prices. That is, if the relative values of the inputs were the same in
both countries. Furthermore, there are some who feel that the search for a
methodology which preserves "comparative advantage" is particularly mis-
guided as applied to East-West trade. 4
b. No Adjustment for Differences in Prices
As suggested earlier, when one takes a production function actually
employed in a certain country and associates prices from another country
with this production function, one is left with a result which is neither fish
nor fowl. The resulting value is not an approximation of the cost of produc-
ing the NME article in the chosen surrogate (for if this item were to be
actually produced in the surrogate, it would reflect the unique use of
technology, expertise and resource endowment of the surrogate, not that of
the NME), nor is it a hard currency approximation of the actual cost of
production in the NME. The latter would be the case only if the relative
prices of all inputs used in the NME's production function were identically
arrayed in the surrogate and in the NME.
If only the Commerce Department could adjust for differences in the
relative prices between the NME and the surrogate, the hypothetical con-
structed value of the product would be an accurate measure of the fair value
of the merchandise under investigation. In order to make the adjustment
correctly, Commerce would have to index the input prices in the NME and
use this index to rearrange the relative prices in the surrogate. Using these
derived surrogate prices, Commerce could then perform a constructed value
calculation. The strength in this exercise is that it fits a production function
to a set of relative prices which resembles the price array of the NME. The
negative aspect of this price ordering is that it picks up relative prices which
reflect not only natural abundances (usually the basis for comparative
advantage) but also the price structure contrived by the NME central
authority. The latter is most unlikely to reflect purely economic considera-
tions.
c. Open to Abuse of Discretion
Finally, the use of the "Polish Golf Car" hypothetical constructed value is
even more filled than other approaches with opportunities for a politicized
administrator to exercise discretion in favor of one side or another. The
choice of a surrogate country in a "normal" NME antidumping proceeding
44. As one recent student of antidumping theory has put it:
Recent attempts by the United States authorities to apply a comparative advantage test in
these cases make sense only if centrally-planned economies seek in the longer run to
approximate a pattern of trade based on comparative advantage as understood by market-
economy countries-a proposition that no student of East-West trade would surely accept.
R. Dale, ANTI-DuMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER 194 (1980).
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(i.e., one where an actual market economy producer's prices or cost will be
used) is limited to a finite range of countries (those with actual producers),
while the Polish Golf Car calculation opens up the entire set of market-
economy countries as a source of possible surrogates. Further, in a normal
market-economy constructed value case, the petitioner has some access to
the country of the surrogate respondent, and can make his own inquiries as
to the reasonableness of the production process described in a response.
This is not generally the situation in an NME hypothetical constructed-value
case where the inputs are being measured in the nonmarket economy.
Finally, only the wealthiest petitioners can afford the expense of investigat-
ing both the exporter's actual operation (in order to estimate the production
function), and the theoretical costs of that operation in a variety of countries
(since the final choice of a surrogate is not known until well into the
petitioning process).
As a side note, the deficiencies of the Polish Golf Car approach, while
manifest, should not cloud the entire approach to NME import relief. In
most cases, there should be actual surrogate producers available from whom
the information can eventually be obtained. Thus far, the hypothetical
constructed value has been rarely used, forming the basis for fair value only
in the cases of montan wax from East Germany (where the market economy
was West Germany) 45 and shop towels from China (where the market
economy was Indonesia).46
G. SECTION 406
Section 406, introduced in 1974 as the solution to market disruption
caused by NME economy imports, has not proven to be very useful to U.S.
industry. Quite simply, no U.S. petitioner has ever received relief under
section 406. The main problem for U.S. industry appears to be the availabil-
ity of Presidential discretion; in every case where the ITC has made the
requisite finding of injury, the President has refused relief. In the most
notoriously politicized case, that involving Russian ammonia, the ITC
found injury as required by statute in 1979. The President then refused to
grant relief because the U.S. was seeking detente with the Soviet Union.
Shortly thereafter, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, at which time the
President reinstituted the investigation on essentially the same facts as those
upon which he had denied relief a few months earlier.47 To his probable
45. See Antidumping; Unrefined Montan Wax from the German Democratic Republic; Final
Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 46 Fed. Reg. 38,555 (1981) as amended by*46
Fed. Reg. 43,727 (1981); Unrefined Montan Wax from the German Democratic Republic; Early
Determination of Antidumping Duty, 47 Fed. Reg. 3579 (1982).
46. Shop Towels of Cottonfrom The People's Republic of China, 48 Fed. Reg. 37,055 (1983).
47. Presidential Proclamation 4714, Temporary Duty Increase on the Importation into the
United States of Certain Anhydrous Ammonia from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 45
Fed. Reg. 3,875 (1980).
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surprise the ITC (whose membership had changed in the meantime) then
denied relief in the case by finding no injury to the U.S. industry. 48
The few cases brought since the Russian ammonia case apparently were
filed because of the perception that section 406 cases are less costly for a
U.S. industry to pursue than the extremely expensive proceedings required
for an NME antidumping case. None of the cases filed in 1981-82 (Chinese
dinnerware, Chinese mushrooms, East German montan wax)49 were suc-
cessful and the filings once again ceased.
One interesting legal issue is presented by section 406 which requires a
finding, inter alia, of "material injury." When section 406 was enacted in
1974, "material injury" represented a degree of injury greater than the
"injury" required by the antidumping laws, and less than the "serious
injury" required for escape clause actions. When the antidumping laws were
revised in 1979 to require a showing of "material injury," Congress made it
clear that the new "material injury" standard for antidumping cases in the
1979 Trade Agreements Act was identical to the "injury" standard for
antidumping under the 1974 Trade Act. In consequence, a good argument
can be made that the antidumping "material injury" standard under the
1979 Act is a lesser degree of injury than the section 406 "material injury"
standard under the 1974 Act.
In fact, this distinction was made in part in cases involving canned
mushrooms from the People's Republic of China. As previously noted, the
filing under section 406 was unsuccessful. A subsequent filing under the
antidumping law50 passed the injury hurdle with the commission noting in its
preliminary finding, "Section 406 is a fair trade provision which requires the
Commission to weigh various causes of material injury. The significant
cause standard has been interpreted to require a more direct causal connec-
tion than the contributing cause standard applied in antidumping."
H. NONMARKET ECONOMY SUBSIDIZATION
1. Problems in Applicability of Countervailing Duty Law
For years, the applicability of the countervailing duty law to products
from NME countries was an issue debated in the abstract among academi-
48. Anhydrous Ammonia from the U.S.S.R.; Report to the President, 45 Fed. Reg. 27,570
(1980). Anhydrous Ammonia from the U.S.S.R.; Discontinuation of Temporary Restraints on
Imports, 45 Fed. Reg. 28,847 (1980).
49. Certain Ceramic Kitchenware and Tableware from The People's Republic of China, 47
Fed. Reg. 38,220 (1982); Canned Mushrooms from The People's Republic of China, 47 Fed.
Reg. 45,981 (1982); Unrefined Montan Wax from East Germany, 47 Fed. Reg. 2,957 (1982). An
investigation of ferrochromium from the Soviet Union was initiated at the request of the U.S.
Trade Representative (and not the domestic industry) in late 1983, but was also unsuccessful. 49
Fed. Reg. 4,857 (1984).
50. Canned Mushrooms from the People's Republic of China, 47 Fed. Reg. 55,336 (1982).
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cians and practitioners in the trade bar. With the filing and initiation of
countervailing duty cases against all textile and apparel products from the
People's Republic of China 51 and steel wire rod from Czechoslovakia 52 and
Poland,53 this academic issue has become a commercial reality.
There appear to be two schools of thought as to whether a countervailable
subsidy can be found within an NME (leaving aside the technical, legal
questions as to whether NME government actions are covered under the
current U.S countervailing duty statutory language). These opposing views
reflect how each group defines the essence of what makes an action a
subsidy.
The first group would say that no countervailable subsidy can exist within
an NME because the entire economy in an NME is driven through govern-
ment intervention. In this mix of positive and negative subsidies touching
every product, it is pointless to try to isolate any one of those "subsidies" for
scrutiny under our countervailing duty law. Trying to correct the distortion
caused by government intervention in the commercial marketplace has no
meaning when the public sector and private sector are essentially one.
Attempting to apply a countervailing duty law to NME's could bring
administrative problems as well. The U.S. countervailing duty law relies on
the existence of commercial benchmarks to determine when a subsidy exists
(i.e., a countervailed subsidy occurs when a government behaves in a way
that is more beneficial to the recipient than the same commercial action
based upon unrestrained market forces). Where, as in an NME, there are no
significant commercial benchmarks, there is no commercial standard against
which to compare the government intervention. Therefore, lacking a mar-
ket-based norm, it is impossible to determine if a producer or exporter is
receiving a subsidy and, if so, how to measure it.
The second school of thought defines a subsidy in a slightly different way
and in so doing opens the door to countervailing NME products. This
definition of subsidy hinges on the concept of preferentiality: if the govern-
ment treats a group specially-to that group's benefit-a subsidy is con-
veyed. The approach could be characterized as follows: If a subsidy is
thought of in economic terms as a governmental action such that one group
benefits relatively more than others in a country, a countervailable subsidy
exists to the extent that the level of benefit to the targeted recipient exceeds
the normal or average level of benefit. This can be done in a market as well
as nonmarket context as long as the average is measurable.
51. Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations; Textiles, Apparel and Related Products
from The People's Republic of China, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,600 (1983).
52. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia; Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investiga-
tion, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,419 (1983).
53. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 48
Fed. Reg. 56,419 (1983).
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All economies in the world are mixed. Recognizing this, this approach
advocates relying on benchmarks reflecting the normal or average commer-
cial situation as faced by business in that country. In determining this
benchmark in "market economy" causes, no attempt is made to strip out the
influence of government in the investigated activity, only to establish the
norm (for example, a government's monetary, fiscal and regulatory policy
exerts heavy direct and indirect influence on a country's interest rate struc-
ture, but when evaluating the subsidy of a low-interest loan, the standard or
benchmark loan rate is that to which the average borrower of similar
commercial status has access, not the market-clearing interest rate which
would prevail in an unregulated capital market).
All of these arguments were made in the context of a heated debate over
the Chinese textile countervailing duty petition filed in September 1983.
Although the Chinese case was withdrawn prior to a preliminary
determination, 54 it had already been followed by countervailing duty peti-
tions on steel wire rod from Poland and Czechoslovakia, thus forcing
Commerce to decide the issue.
In the final determination in the Polish and Czech cases, Commerce came
to a more conclusive result, determining that, while the statute by its terms
does not exclude nonmarket economies, no subsidy could be found within
an economy determined to be nonmarket. The essence of Commerce's
analysis was that subsidies are distortions to the free market, and the
concept made no sense in nonmarket economies. 55 Consequently, no coun-
tervailing duty could be imposed in a nonmarket economy case. Commerce
reaffirmed this decision shortly thereafter, in refusing to investigate allega-
tions of subsidization of potash from several Eastern European countries. 56
III. Proposed Solutions
While there is quite a bit of debate as to how trade with NMEs should be
handled under the U.S. unfair import laws, almost nobody claims the
current cumbersome, arbitrary and costly procedure under the antidumping
law, which yields unpredictable results, or the ambiguity of action taken
under the countervailing duty law, is optimal. Acknowledging the need for
change alters the debate from a question of "whether?" to one of "in what
way?" The following are some of the proposals.
54. Textile, apparel, and related products from The Peoples' Republic of China: Termination
of Countervailing Duty Investigation. 48 Fed. Reg. 55,492 (Dec. 13, 1983).
55. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia; Final Negative Countervailing Duty Deter-
mination. 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370 (May 7, 1984). Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Final
Negative Countervailing Duty Determination. 49 Fed. Reg. 19,474 (June 7, 1984).
56. Potassium Chloride from the German Democratic Republic; Rescission of Initiation of
Countervailing Duty Investigation and Dismissal of Petition. 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (June 6, 1984).
Potassium Chloride from the Soviet Union; Rescission of Initiation of Countervailing Duty
Investigation and Dismissal of Petition. 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (June 6, 1984).
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A. USE OF A "TRUE" EXCHANGE RATE
One method of overcoming the problems of measuring dumping from
NMEs would be to base the concept of NME dumping on a sales-below-cost
approach. Under this methodology, one would sidestep the problem of
government allocation of goods, price setting and nonconvertible currencies
through the use of a constructed exchange rate. There are numerous "con-
structions" of exchange rates available from a variety of sources-various
agencies of the U.S. Government, certain money center banks and multi-
lateral lending institutions to name a few. If the administering authority
were to choose one source and make that choice publicly available, produc-
ers in NMEs could apply that rate to their costs of productionand be able to
ascertain their minimum "fair" price for U.S. sales. Similarly, U.S. produc-
ers could estimate the NME producer's cost of production (as they do at
present with market economy producers) and by applying this constructed
exchange rate, ascertain the fairness of the NME sales with which they are
competing in the U.S. market. Uncertainty would be minimized.
One major technical difficulty would be the need to sufficiently lag the
reference period for the cost of production calculation behind the sale in
order for all components of the calculation to be known. Specifically, if an
NME producer were trying to price its third quarter sales, it would have to
use as a reference point its costs from a prior period as the basis for this
calculation (generally one or two quarters depending upon how long items
remain in inventory). This amount of time, between production and sales
which Commerce would apply, should be generally known so that all parties
could make their calculations on the same basis.
The attraction of the above method is that it is of relatively low cost to
petitioners and respondents and is much more administrable than the pres-
ent approach. Once an exchange rate basis is decided upon and applied to
the values of inputs reported by the NME, analysis of the appropriateness of
these inputs to the cost of production calculation and verification of these
inputs would proceed as in a normal case.
The serious flaw in this approach appears to be that it accepts the NME's
production function as "valid." That is, this methodology does not deal with
the subsidies embedded in the price structure and quota allocations in the
economy that the NME government provides to the producer. For example,
if the NME government gives the producer oil for power generation at a very
cheap rate (both in comparison to world prices for oil and the internal price
for oil to other NME producers), this is likely to appear in the production
function as a relatively high use of oil in relation to other inputs, and at a
relatively low price. By pricing oil "low" and making it abundantly available
to the exporting producer, the NME has artifically reduced the product's
cost of production. Thus, in comparison a low export price to the U.S. would
be found to be acceptable.
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If the U.S. industry, in addition to a dumping case brought in the above
fashion, has full and meaningful access to the countervailing duty law, this
would not be a problem. In that case, a cost-of-production based dumping
action would be brought and a tariff administered equal to any difference
between the U.S. price and the actual cost of production (calculated as
described above) of the goods. The additional benefit of the cheap oil would
be reachable as a subsidy (which it would be) under the countervailing duty
law.
However, constructed exchange rates are generally not considered for
analysis at anything but the most aggregate macroeconomic level. These
rates reflect very gross economic characteristics and trends. They lose much
of their meaningfulness when applied to particular products such as shoes or
wax or mushrooms which are quite small in comparison to the total econ-
omy.
B. "THE HEINZ BILL"
1. Description
First proposed as S. 1966 in 1979 and subsequently revised and resubmit-
ted as S. 958 in 1981 and S. 1351 in 1983, the Heinz bill (as it is called after its
chief sponsor) has gone the farthest in developing an alternative approach to
handling NME import problems under the unfair trade laws (the Heinz bill
was dropped in Conference at the end of the 1984 Small Fee Congressional
Session). Under this legislative proposal the Commerce Department would
not even seek to measure fair value in NMEs, but would simply look at other
producers' prices within the U.S. market. To avoid comparing NME export-
ers with high-cost producers, the reference price would be the lowest aver-
age price in the U.S. charged by exporters from any free market country,
including the U.S. (or any significant individual firm, foreign or domestic).
Since NME producers are unlikely, in most cases, to be more efficient than
the most efficient free-market producer, the difference between the NME
producer's price and the lowest free-market price would measure the
"dumping" by a nonmarket producer.
Under the Heinz bill, NME industries would not be compared to free-
market producers that are subsidized or engaged in dumping. With this
exception, nonmarket exporters who meet the lowest average prices
charged by any single free-market seller in the U.S. would be considered to
be trading fairly. In this way, importers of NME products would be able to
match, and even undercut, the prices of their U.S. competitors in the U.S.
market as long as they were matching other "fair" prices.
At the beginning of the investigation, the Commerce Department would
consult with the nonmarket economy's government, soliciting from it in-
formation (if available) that would enable the Department to determine
dumping or the presence of a subsidy subject to the standards used for
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"normal" market economy cases. Such information may or may not be
available, depending on both the nature of the economy and the particular
industry in question. If, in the Department's judgment, sufficient, verifiable
information was provided to permit the case to be treated as a normal
antidumping or countervailing duty case, then the Department would do so,
moving the investigation to the appropriate "normal" track. The Depart-
ment would also, from that point on, treat the case in accordance with the
deadlines for "normal" cases.
In the typical case, where the nonmarket economy will not or cannot
provide the necessary information which would allow the complaint to be
handled in a "normal" way, the lowest-average-price standard of fairness
would be employed. In the "1981" version of S. 958, the relief procedures
under section 406 would have been abolished. Market disruption by NMEs
would be handled through existing escape clause procedures under section
201 of the Trade Act of 1974. Although this approach is more consistent with
the division in current law between fair and unfair trade practice relief
provisions, the drafters of S. 1351 abandoned this approach leaving the
current section 406 intact. The antidumping law is modified instead.
2. Problems in Proposed Legislation
a. Who Is a Nonmarket Economy Producer or Exporter?
Attaching a simplistic label such as "market" or "nonmarket" to some-
thing as complex as a national economy is inaccurate, but a necessity no
matter which approach to import relief is chosen. Experience thus far shows
that each case is unique and reflects the country and particular economic
sector under investigation. It is likely that any statutory criteria defining
"market" or "nonmarket" would be too brief to be truly meaningful. Yet as
many investigators say, "you know it if you see it." The problem is more in
the description of the criteria than in the ability to recognize the existence of
market versus nonmarket economic behavior.
The European Communities antidumping regulations 57 and section 406
rely on legislated lists of countries. At first this approach appears desirable
because it would greatly reduce the waste of time and resources involved in
arguments over whether or not a given case should be treated as an NME
case (most of them will be). However, the use of a fixed list, and the
difficulty of changing the content of that list once one has been legislated,
would make it politically and practically difficult in the U.S. to give recogni-
tion to the efforts which several NMEs are making to liberalize their econo-
mies. Given the overall U.S. interest in such liberalization, any regulatory
system for dealing with NME dumping should be flexible enough to take
57. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/79, 20.12.79, Art. 2.5.
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account of those countries which make significant gains in such liberalization
efforts.
b. Sole U.S. Producer Situation
When the NME import is the only competition for a product produced by
only one U.S. company, there is a problem using the sole U.S. producer's
price as the floor for both the U.S. industry and its foreign competition. If
the U.S. industry is the sole producer of the product in this country or the
industry is highly concentrated (not unlikely with narrow product definitions
such as unrefined montan wax) and there is no other real source of import
competition, the U.S. producer can continually raise its price and let the
U.S. government force its competition, the NME import, to meet it. The
presence of other imports could keep downward pressure on price to the
extent that the foreign (free market) producer chooses not to raise his own
prices to the U.S. In many circumstances, though, it is conceivable that both
the U.S. producer and market economy importer could use a dumping
complaint as a vehicle to enforce price rises to the detriment of national
welfare.
In the above situation, if the fair import price were tied not to the NME
importer's sole competitor's price but rather to the U.S. producers' verified
production costs plus a mark-up for profit, the acceptable price of NME
merchandise would be based upon cost, a factor which businesses attempt to
minimize, rather than on prices, an item which businesses try to sustain at
the highest level. This is especially important in the occasional case (such as
with montan wax) when the U.S. industry is highly concentrated and able to
restrict supply so that prices far exceed cost. In that instance, the nonmarket
producer may be the only source of competition, and its market presence
should be encouraged, not eliminated.
c. GATT Consistency
The GATT Working Party, considering Poland's accession to the GATT,
explicitly declared its understanding that the nonmarket exception to the
antidumping normal value test would apply to Poland.58 This is interesting
in two respects. It suggests that in the eyes of the GATT one need not take at
face value the apparently strict GATT requirement for application of the
NME exception that a country have "a complete or substantially complete
monopoly of its trade" and that "all domestic prices [be] fixed by the State."
Even in 1967, Poland probably did not fit this test if it were rigorously
applied.
Second and more important, the Working Party explicitly recognized,
58. GATT, Working Party on Poland's Accession to the GAT[ in 15 BISD 111 (GATT
1968).
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"that a contracting party may use as the normal value (e.g., "fair value") for
a product imported from Poland the prices which prevail generally in its
markets for the same or like products." This, of course, is precisely what is
proposed by S. 1351. The EC applies its antidumping regulations governing
NMEs (presumably, in compliance with the GATT), including the use of a
methodology based on prices within the EC,59 to countries which are GATT
members.
Both the Polish and Hungarian GATT accession agreements attempted
to directly address the low-priced import issue. Initially the Polish Protocol
of Accession included promises by Poland that its exports would be priced at
levels prevailing in the Western importing markets. Imports at lower prices
would be potentially subject to duties to bring them up to this level. This
proposal was never accepted but it is important in that it expressed the ideas
of many of the contracting parties as to what constituted a fair import price
for NME goods. 60
The Working Party on the accession of Hungary addressed this issue in its
1973 report. In this report, the parties indicated that Hungary would be
considered to be trading fairly if Hungarian exports were traded at world
prices. In the absence of world prices, the prevailing prices in the countries
of importation were to be taken into consideration.6 t
d. U.S. Industry Criticism-S. 1351 Legitimizes Nonmarket Dumping
Many U.S. industries are opposed to any system which would use the
lowest average free-market price as the standard. They usually cite the
following objections: (i) such a standard would assume, for fair value
assessment purposes, that NMEs are generally as efficient as the most
efficient free-market producer; (ii) it would permit a "safe harbor" for
imports of injuriously dumped or subsidized NME products in the U.S.
market; (iii) it could lead to a "meeting competition" injury defense for
market economy producers selling dumped or subsidized imports in the
U.S. market in competition with U.S. producers and NME imports; (iv) it
could grant NMEs a lower pricing standard than that afforded to certain
market suppliers whose costs or prices for a particular item are those of the
59. See Commission Decision 81/406/EEC:4.06.81., accepting undertakings in connection
with the antidumping proceeding concerning imports of ball and tapered roller bearings,
originating in Japan, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union and terminating that proceeding;
Commission Decision 82/220/EEC:14.04.82 terminating an antidumping proceeding in respect
of imports of upright pianos originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic
and Poland; Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1958/82, 16.06.82. imposing a provisional
anti-dumping duty on imports of photographic enlargers originating in Poland and the
U.S.S.R., accepting an undertaking and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of
photographic enlargers originating in Czechoslovakia.
60. DALE, ANTI-DUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER 182 (1980).
61. Id. at 182.
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lowest free market producer; and (v) there is disagreement as to how the
Commerce Department could determine with any degree of accuracy the
"lowest average free-market price."
e. Nonmarket Economy Countries' Criticism-
S. 1351 Denies Comparative Advantage
As a Joint Economic Committee study pointed out in 1979, the present
system deprives NME producers of any "comparative" advantage unless by
chance the "comparable" country chosen by the administrative authority
under section 773(c) has the identical comparative advantage as the NME,
which is most unlikely. This has been the theme of the most common
criticism of section 1351 from NMEs. Indeed, any system of measuring the
supposed home-market value of a NME product will inevitably deprive that
economy of the certainty of receiving credit for its true comparative advan-
tage, since that concept cannot be measured in a NME. Section 1351 would
not attempt to measure comparative advantage (or home-market value) in
an NME. Instead, it would allow an NME to sell in the U.S. as low as anyone
else in the U.S. marketplace, thus implicitly assuring NME producers are as
advantaged as the lowest priced U.S. market participant (some market
economy exporters to the U.S. might well wish for the same treatment).
f. Technical Problems
There are a number of technical problems with the Heinz bill requiring
attention. Suggestions are made below concerning these.
"Most suitable"-The bill provides as a yardstick the lesser of the lowest
average price of "the most suitable" U.S. or foreign producer selling in the
U.S. The reference to "the most suitable" producer should be changed to
"any significant" U.S. or foreign producer selling in the U.S., to avoid a
misunderstanding of the intent of the bill to use the lowest average price
(except for prices of minor unrepresentative sales) as the benchmark for
NME imports.
Time limits-The bill provides for preliminary Commerce determination
by day 85, or if complicated by day 150; final Commerce determination by
day 160, or if complicated by day 225. The time limits for an artificial pricing
investigation, however, are appropriate for only those cases initiated and
remaining on the NME track.
Timelimits for switching-Time limits of investigating cases are
"switched" from "artificial pricing" to normal antidumping/countervailing
duty procedures, or vice versa. Section 748 would permit Commerce an
extra 30 days if a "switch" were made (i.e., if no preliminary determination
had been made, the investigation would be placed at the same spot on the
timetable of the new procedure as it was on the original procedure, with an
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additional 30 days allowed, while if a preliminary determination had been
made, Commerce would have to issue a new one under the standards of the
new procedures within 30 days).
The 30-day grace period may be sufficient for a "switch" from antidump-
ing/countervailing to artificial pricing, since 30 days should be enough time
to gather the minimally sufficient data to support a preliminary determina-
tion. A "switch" from artificial pricing to antidumping/countervailing,
however, would require considerably more extra time (probably at least 60
days), since only a little (if any) of the information needed for an antidump-
ing or countervailing duty determination would have been gathered for the
decision to make the "switch."
GA TT-Under the bill, artificial pricing investigations get the injury test
if the exporting country is a GATT member. All other artificial pricing
investigations get no injury test. A review should be made to determine if
there are countries which are not GATT members to which the U.S. owes
the injury test (such as the seven non-GATT members to which the U.S.
extends an injury test in countervailing duty cases pursuant to pre-1979
bilateral agreements). If so, those countries must be given the injury test in
artificial pricing cases. If an artificial pricing case is viewed, in essence, as a
dumping case, an argument can be made that all petitions should be sub-
jected to the injury test (although the lack of the injury test for cases against
non-GATT members may be viewed as an incentive to non-GATT member
NMEs to liberalize their economies enough to join the GATT).
Extension of time-Under the bill, extensions of time limits are permitted
for number and complexity of transactions, novelty of issues, or number of
firms to be investigated (tracking the similar provision of the AD law).
The following should be added to the reasons for extending the timetable
for a case where an NME exporter is involved: the complexity of the
economy being studied; and the difficulty of finding a market-economy
producer that will provide the necessary data for calculation of the lowest
average price in the U.S.
C. SECTION 406 REVISION
Even though the elimination of section 406 has been dropped in the
newest version of the Heinz bill, it would be preferable if section 406 were
eliminated and a single, non-discretionary provision for cases involving
unfair NME imports were created. This would leave cases of injury caused
by NME imports not alleged to be unfair to section 201 (as is the case with
imports from market economies). The fear underlying section 406 of a
Communist country storing up goods and suddenly flooding the U.S. market
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with them in order to cause commercial havoc could be handled by adding
the "emergency" provisions of section 40662 to section 201.
1. Minimize/Eliminate Discretion
If section 406 is retained and no attempt is made to change the current
potentially discretionary methodology of measuring antidumping from
NMEs, then the Presidential discretion in section 406 should be eliminated,
or at least severely restricted. At present, the U.S. industry has a non-
discretionary remedy against imports from market economies (the anti-
dumping/countervailing laws), as well as discretionary remedies (sections
201/301). Domestic industry should have the same access to a non-
discretionary remedy against imports from nonmarket economics. If section
406 is the only practical remedy against imports from NMEs, then it should
be non-discretionary, or, at least, the President's exercise of discretionary
vetos should require Congressional concurrence (to the extent constitu-
tionally feasible).
2. Technical Changes
A major flaw in section 406 is the burden it imposes on industries seeking
relief. In an ordinary escape clause proceeding, the petitioner must show
that imports are increasing, but section 406 adds a requirement that imports
be increasing "rapidly." There is no clear reason for imposing a greater
burden on industries faced with competition from NMEs than those facing
world-wide competition.
3. GA TT Consistency
Relief under section 406 is easier (at least on paper) than that outlined in
the Polish, Romanian and Hungarian Protocols of Accession to the GATT.
The possibility of conflict between the GATT rules and interpretations and
section 406 has been recognized. For example, the 1975 U.S.-Romanian
bilateral trade agreement recognizes that either party may apply its own
import control laws (e.g., section 406).63 The standards in section 406 should
be conformed to the Protocols of Accession. If that is done, there should not
be major GATr problems with reliance on section 406.
An additional inconsistency occurs in that the Polish, Romanian and
Hungarian Protocols each include escape clause provisions which are more
easily accessible than Article XIX. Of major importance in this area is the
fact that action under these protocols does not run afoul of the GATT's
most-favored-nation requirements. Arguably, section 406 would have to be
62. The Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618.§ 406(c), 88 Stat. 2062 (1978) (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2436(c) (1982)).
63. Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States of America and the Socialist
Republic of Romania, April 2, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 2305, T.I.A.S. 8159, Annex 1.
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conformed to the standards of the Protocols of Accession to escape the MFN
requirements.
IV. Conclusion
The Heinz bill should be enacted after the appropriate changes (outlined
above) are made. The use of antidumping laws is an accepted phenomenon
around the world, whatever their economic rationale (or lack thereof).
Similarly, their use against NME imports has become an accepted practice
(including by the nonmarket economy exporters, who are the frequent
target of EC antidumping cases), notwithstanding the lack of economic
foundation for the surrogate-country procedure for calculating normal
value. S. 1351 would make the procedure completely routine, to be handled
at a technical level (which is where disputes over such items as golf carts and
mushrooms should be).
The basic concept of the Heinz approach is fair-even if not perfect. Some
more efficient NME producers will be penalized, and some inefficient NME
producers will be spared antidumping duties, but in general the standard will
provide access to the U.S. market for NME producers/countries to which
the U.S. exports quite a bit, while mitigating the disruption caused by
extremely low pricing. The best proof of the fairness of the Heinz bill can be
seen in the equal opposition to it from both ends of the spectrum.
If the opposition to the Heinz proposal from both U.S. industry and NME
producers means that there is insufficient support in the middle for the
measure, the next best solution would simply be to exclude NME imports
from the antidumping/countervailing duty laws. In its place should be pro-
vided a single, non-discretionary remedy-most likely a revised version of
section 406 without presidential review.
If the President were totally excluded from the process, the ITC would
simply vote on the existence of the requisite injury and causation and on the
remedy to be applied (much as it does with the recommended remedies now
under section 406 and section 201). This injury-only solution need not be
overly harsh. The current ITC procedure of recommending relief could be
amended to carry with it an opportunity for the President to negotiate relief
other than that recommended by the ITC, but with the proviso that the
petitioning domestic industry could challenge the President's alternative
before the ITC. If the ITC agreed with the petitioner then it could substitute
on a mandatory basis its own preferred form of relief.
Neither a modified version of S. 1351 nor an amended procedure under
section 406 will create unusual problems within the trading community.
Still, the problem of fitting NME imports into the context of "fair" trade as
defined by the antidumping and countervailing duty laws is probably unsolv-
able as long as the standards of fairness reflect market rules of commercial
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behavior. Recognizing that this ideological difference in economic philoso-
phy is likely to remain, the most appropriate approach to unfair trade relief
from NMEs is to concentrate on rectifying the symptoms and effects of the
import problems and sidestep the intellectual problem itself. S. 1351 (as
modified) does this best. A new section 406 procedure with lowered discre-
tion does this less well but still better than the current approach-the
cumbersome, chaotic, and unpredictable methods under the antidumping
and countervailing duty laws or the heavily politicized results under the
current section 406.
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